Norms and Nobility discussion

[Beth in Mint Hill]

...And I'm wondering if this sort of dynamic -- not just the emphasis on debate -- is contributing to the situation that several of us have noticed in some Christian classical schools.

I really resonate with what you're saying here! I've never, ever, liked the emphasis on debate. Once long ago, when I was teaching Latin (highschool level) to a little group of homeschoolers, I had the hardest time getting the students to spend any disciplined time with the subject; they were too busy going to debate camps and such things! I vividly remember thinking then, "Aren't we putting the cart before the horse here? Don't we need to develop our mental discipline a little bit--and spend more time thinking, reading and growing--before we take pride in our debate skills? Aaaargghhh.

[ElizaG]

(...) For our schools, then, it seems we would want to be aware of the balance between the grace of formal supports and the danger of superficiality. 

 

That's an interesting point.  I think we're talking about different scenarios, though.

 

1) People who are not really committed to the faith (but want to look/feel as if they are) can get puffed up by doing lots and lots of outward religious practices. 

 

2) People who are committed to the faith (but are not spiritually mature) can get puffed up by going deep intellectually -- studying philosophy, theology, or secular "great ideas" -- and somehow thinking that this substitutes for spiritual formation.  

 

It seems as if part of the cure for #2 would be to do more praying (especially liturgical or community prayer), works of charity, etc., in order to discipline one's habits. 

 

But part of the cure for #1 might be to do more studying (along with personal, extemporaneous prayer), in order to clarify one's beliefs.

[Mrs. A]

That's an interesting point.  I think we're talking about different scenarios, though.

 

1) People who are not really committed to the faith (but want to look/feel as if they are) can get puffed up by doing lots and lots of outward religious practices. 

 

2) People who are committed to the faith (but are not spiritually mature) can get puffed up by going deep intellectually -- studying philosophy, theology, or secular "great ideas" -- and somehow thinking that this substitutes for spiritual formation.  

 

It seems as if part of the cure for #2 would be to do more praying (especially liturgical or community prayer), works of charity, etc., in order to discipline one's habits. 

 

But part of the cure for #1 might be to do more studying (along with personal, extemporaneous prayer), in order to clarify one's beliefs.

 

 

So in order to help counter both situations there needs to be balance. More prayer and more study.  Or perhaps it would be better to say that there shouldn't be an emphasis on one to the exclusion of the other. The pendulum has to stop swinging to the extreme ends. 

[justamouse]

I just came across this on CiRCE's site:

 

A Fake Somebody vs. a Real Nobody -- Joshua Gibbs

 

and it sort of fits with my concerns here.  If the curriculum puts an emphasis on teaching these norms and ideals explicitly (i.e., not just implicitly, through experience -- which seems to have been more the way it was done in traditional classical education), what's to stop this from leading to an intellectual preoccupation with building up some image of the "classic self" -- or the "heroic self," the "noble self," the "virtuous self," etc.?

 

I'm not saying Hicks is promoting this, at all.  Given human weakness, though, this sort of puffing-up just seems all too likely.  

 

And I'm wondering if this sort of dynamic -- not just the emphasis on debate -- is contributing to the situation that several of us have noticed in some Christian classical schools. 

 

Catholics might be especially prone to this, because our faith gives us so many "ready answers" at hand, as well as so many heroic role models (the saints).  I wonder if this is why we're getting a dose of Pope Francis and his "obsession with humility," to use Gibbs' phrase.

 

I read that post the other day and loved it. I didn't think to link it here, thank you. 

[justamouse]

I really resonate with what you're saying here! I've never, ever, liked the emphasis on debate. Once long ago, when I was teaching Latin (highschool level) to a little group of homeschoolers, I had the hardest time getting the students to spend any disciplined time with the subject; they were too busy going to debate camps and such things! I vividly remember thinking then, "Aren't we putting the cart before the horse here? Don't we need to develop our mental discipline a little bit--and spend more time thinking, reading and growing--before we take pride in our debate skills? Aaaargghhh.

 

I so agree. Fr Donnelly's book stated they learned Latin for 5 hours a day. All kinds of composition WITH that Latin. Rhetoric was held off until university when they actually had something TO debate. 

[Meriwether]

I finished and it left me a little in despair. I feel like it is possible to make changes in my children's education, but I worry about where my society is heading. In my opinion Americans have a very descriptive attitude about man, but at the same time the schools in my area are teaching a prescriptive ideal, just not the one I believe in. How does a society like the United States even agree on an ideal to teach? Should we all just teach our own? How would that work in a public school? Maybe I should just focus on my family.

 

 

Relevant to the old vs. new selves, DH, who is agnostic in the sense of being atheistic for all intents and purposes, would point out that the transcendent ideas & inherited truths manifest perfectly well in the material universe -- one cannot have a thought or hold a belief that does not manifest physically in the mind, for instance.  The dichotomy seems entirely false.  I am finding that Hicks does not seem to understand (to have taken the trouble to understand? but he clearly takes a great deal of trouble generally) the sophisticated, thoughtful and worthy versions of reality held by agnostics/atheists.

I think education, the formative aspect of it, does contain a good measure of indoctrination. I'm a parent, though, who has said since my oldest was a baby that parenting is 90% brainwashing. In this context brainwashing did not have a negative connotation for me. How many things do our kids absorb from repeated actions and words?

 

Hicks says, "Intellectuals, the media, and ethnic leaders tend to dwell upon our differences, which are often more interesting (for some reason) than our similarities. This makes it all the more important for schools to define in their curricula a common American culture and in this way to frame the debate that will naturally arise in a pluralistic society like our own."

 

I haven't read much of the book yet. I'm wondering if Hicks addresses "a common American culture" in more depth. How would he respond to the above posts?

[serendipitous journey]

That's an interesting point.  I think we're talking about different scenarios, though.

 

1) People who are not really committed to the faith (but want to look/feel as if they are) can get puffed up by doing lots and lots of outward religious practices. 

 

2) People who are committed to the faith (but are not spiritually mature) can get puffed up by going deep intellectually -- studying philosophy, theology, or secular "great ideas" -- and somehow thinking that this substitutes for spiritual formation.  

 

It seems as if part of the cure for #2 would be to do more praying (especially liturgical or community prayer), works of charity, etc., in order to discipline one's habits. 

 

But part of the cure for #1 might be to do more studying (along with personal, extemporaneous prayer), in order to clarify one's beliefs.

 

The scenarios may not be fundamentally different. 

 

Are we moving toward truth, toward communion, toward the Lord?  It seems to me that, in both of the above examples of "puffery", movement toward simplicity and the Gospels is a useful beginning point. 

 

1. Certainly both are seen in the negative aspects of Pharisaism (I try to remember that the Pharisees were similar to the Lord in terms of trying to renew Judaism, though different in methods, which seems to be why Jesus so often engaged them): both the self-satisfaction in terms of outward observance and the self-satisfaction in terms of intellectual puzzling. 

 

2.  There is not a clear line between those who do and those don't get puffed up by "lots of outward religious practices" -- I think very, very few people explicitly know they are not committed to the faith and choose to engage in deceptive outward practices.  Nearly all of us wander into that territory occasionally, if we are trying to live lives of obedience.  Similarly, intellectual studying is one sort of outward practice. 

 

3.  In all cases, a return to simple obedience to the Lord's calls of not-judging, of removing  the logs from our own eyes, of seeing to the practical needs of those around us -- are they hungry?  are they cold?  are they ill?  are they poor?  are they lonely? -- seems useful.  Particularly combining obedience to the Lord's commands with a resolute focus on our own logs. 

 

ETA -- I think my post may have missed your point.  My point that puffery/hypocrisy vulnerabilities among Catholics was related to the [relative] focus on observances and formalities [again, recognizing that these observances also carry rich potential for reflection and contemplation] -- well, I think it seems to you that this point is a bit sidewise to your post, which was intending to talk about the more intellectual puffery. 

 

FWIW to my mind there really is not a fundamental difference between intellectual and other forms of observance/religious behavior, and I intended to imply that the vulnerabilities are similar.  In both cases the truth-value placed by the Catholic church on tradition, and the enormous availability of symbolic and analytical texts, icons, reflections, prayers -- these bring a risk of puffery, which I suppose might be a form of idolatry?  misplaced devotion or faith?  perhaps not. 

 

At any rate, it seems that any institution essentially concerned with virtue but rooted in tradition and with an emphasis on certain forms/texts/symbols -- as a classically-rooted Classical school will be -- would have similar problems/concerns. 

[ElizaG]

Similarly, intellectual studying is one sort of outward practice. (...)

 

FWIW to my mind there really is not a fundamental difference between intellectual and other forms of observance/religious behavior, and I intended to imply that the vulnerabilities are similar. 

 

This is where we seem to part company.  I don't think that studying philosophy and discussing Great Books are forms of "outward practice" or "observance/religious behavior," even if the people involved happen to be Catholic (or Reformed, or Methodist, or anything else).   So I've been pretty much like this with much of your last couple of posts:   :confused1:

 

For what it's worth, though, it's also possible to get puffed up about feeding the hungry, giving blankets to the poor, and all those other things you recommended as alternatives.  Even the most apparently benign and humble activity can contribute to a "fake somebody" self-image, if we allow it. 

[justamouse]

Beauty in the Word, pg 63

"The conflict McLuhan describes between the three elements of the Trivium in Western thought prior to the Renaissance is largely due to the loss of a 'depth dimension; in which the three Ways might be seen as distinct yet convergent. At the level of methodology--on the flat plain, as it were--there is tension, if not conflict, between them right enough, and a continual jockeying for position. But to the extent all three Ways are concerned with rising above the plane to attain Truth, conflict gives way to complimentarity. 

In his Tractate on Dialecic, Plontios, the founder of Neoplationisim, describes it as  'the precious part oh Philosophy'-- or, in Thomas Taylor's translation, 'an honorable part.' It is not the whole oh philosophy, but it leads to Wisdom; it is an instrument of Philosophy, and Plotinus is at great pains to describe how it leads to two types of human being,  the 'musician' (or artist) ad the 'lover' step by step from the beauty they can recognize--in a lovely picture or one, for example, or a desiriable woman or man--towards the One Principal that is Absolute Beauty. Thus Dialectic in its true sense is not at all in conflict with Grammar (which leaps toward the Principal by intuition and analogy) to with Rhetoric (which provides the techniques by which the heart may be moved). It 'does not consist of bare theories and rules; it deals with verities [things]' and comes to rest in contemplation when its task is fulfilled." 

Ok, I promise I will quote some more Norms, but this seemed appropriate to the discussion, also. :D

[justamouse]

A person can get puffed up in any way. With anything. It has nothing to do with institutions, it has to do with pride, which seems to go back a bit further than religion. 

How bout we get back to the book?

[ariasmommy]

A person can get puffed up in any way. With anything. It has nothing to do with institutions, it has to do with pride, which seems to go back a bit further than religion.

 

How bout we get back to the book?

Not too get too far ahead, but he is addressing the problem of egocentrism in classical ed. at least somewhat in the chapter I'm currently reading, The Promise of Christian Paideia.

 

N & N sure is a challenging read, but I'm glad I finally took the plunge. :)

[serendipitous journey]

A person can get puffed up in any way. With anything. It has nothing to do with institutions, it has to do with pride, which seems to go back a bit further than religion. 

 

How bout we get back to the book?

 

Fair enough!  Thank you for re-routing.  :)   I am sorry I got so distracted -- we are all a bit sick here (when I'm sick I get rather stupid), and when I woke up this morning I realized that I'd not only muddled what I meant to say, I'd wandered far from the topic! 

 

Are we are on a particular section of N&N?  I was not sure if the prologue was actually open for talk yet, and ought to have checked before posting about it! 

 

I myself am having trouble with the book at a very fundamental level.  I am trying to track down a general argument being made, one particular claim, that is coherent, consistent and substantiated in something and I just can't yet.  That's what my post with the bulleted points was trying to accomplish. 

 

Is anyone else interested in tracking down a particular idea/claim?  Can someone help me trace something through?  I myself am in the first chapter, but this weekend can dedicate some time to the book.  Ideally I would be pulling a bit of a Mortimer Adler/How to Read a Book with it, and track down the author's claims and terms, but I'm just a bit stuck.  Perhaps I should grab the time today to do an Adler-esque read-the-entire-book, then come back to the details. 

 

I"m just afraid I may not get around to the second reading ... fortunately, this thread is motivating me! 

[justamouse]

 

Are we are on a particular section of N&N?  I was not sure if the prologue was actually open for talk yet, and ought to have checked before posting about it! 

 

 

 

We're in the prologue. 

 

It tends to be a balck or white book, you either love it or you hate it. 

[serendipitous journey]

We're in the prologue.

thanks!

 

 

It tends to be a black or white book, you either love it or you hate it. 

Does it matter whether I love or hate it?  I don't especially think so myself.  What matters to me, at least, is whether or not it is true; and whether or not it is important, is a good use of the time I'm stealing from my other work & my other leisure. 

[LostintheCosmos]

Does it matter whether I love or hate it?  I don't especially think so myself.  What matters to me, at least, is whether or not it is true; and whether or not it is important, is a good use of the time I'm stealing from my other work & my other leisure. 

 

Well, if it's true, you should love it, and if it's not, it would be more virtuous to have the opposite response.  ;)

 

Here's my best attempt at finding a concise summation of Hicks' project:

 

"My purpose in writing this book is to offer a personal interpretation of classical education - its ends, as well as some of its means - and to respond to objections of those who might approve of the goals of such an education, but who believe that it cannot meet the needs of an industrial democracy or that it is not feasible as a model for mass education." (3)

 

I think it's interesting that at the outset he indicates he is less interested in the traditional methods education - he says will only address "some of its means." That last question - can classical education be democratic? - strikes me as pretty vital, so I look forward to how he develops that aspect of his argument. 

 

The ends of classical education, he seems to argue, are "to educate the young to know what is good, to serve it above self, to reproduce it, and to recognize that in knowledge lies this responsibility." (1) "The supreme task of education [is] the cultivation of the human spirit." (13) This is done "by presenting a complete vision of man as he lives and as he ought to live in all his domains - the individual, the social, and the religious." (13) Thus "it teaches the student how to fulfill his obligations to himself, to his fellow man, and to God and His creation." (13)

 

He contrasts this with what schools today see as their purpose:

 

"The modern era cannot be bothered with finding new answers to old questions like: What is man and what are his purposes? Rather, it demands of its schools: How can modern man better get along in this complicated modern world? Getting along - far from suggesting any sort of Socratic self-knowledge or stoical self-restraint - implies the mastery of increasingly sophisticated methods of control over the environment and over others. Man's lust for power, not truth, feeds modern education." (8)

 

Hicks doesn't seem, to me, to offer much in the way of evidence for this characterization of modern education. Rather, he argues today "we" have a "fixation with technique to the detriment of the task" (13) and assumes this has both cause and effect in modern education. I happen to agree with his description in part (I think many modern schools are conditioning students to be the stuff that others act upon, rather than themselves the actors), but if one didn't, or if one did, but didn't see it as problematic, then his offered solutions aren't going to be of much interest.

[serendipitous journey]

okay, I'm coming to terms with the Prologue.  (many thx to my angelic DH, who is very tired of all things normative & noble at the moment ;) )

 

purpose (end of Prologue part I, p3 my edition):

"My purpose in writing this book is to offer a personal interpretation of classical education -- its ends, as well as some of its means -- and to respond to the objections of those who might approve of the goals of such an education, but who believe that it cannot meet the needs of an industrial democracy or that it is not feasible as a model for mass education." 

 

That is helpful to me, as the whole thing hangs nicely once I consider it as a personal perspective. 

 

ETA: LostCove, thank you for that concise summary!  which for some reason didn't appear on my computer until after I'd posted.  I agree with your summary, and the lack of evidence for his characterization of modern education.  I agree that he well characterizes the idiocy one can find in modern educational theory, but find he leaves out the good stuff. 

 

[ElizaG]

I think it's interesting that at the outset he indicates he is less interested in the traditional methods education - he says will only address "some of its means." That last question - can classical education be democratic? - strikes me as pretty vital, so I look forward to how he develops that aspect of his argument. 

 

 

The ends of classical education, he seems to argue, are "to educate the young to know what is good, to serve it above self, to reproduce it, and to recognize that in knowledge lies this responsibility." (1) "The supreme task of education [is] the cultivation of the human spirit." (13) This is done "by presenting a complete vision of man as he lives and as he ought to live in all his domains - the individual, the social, and the religious." (13) Thus "it teaches the student how to fulfill his obligations to himself, to his fellow man, and to God and His creation." (13)

 

Norms and ideals are supposed to be a part of all Christian education, and I think the same would apply to most other religious traditions.   If you take out some of the the parts about God, they're also a part of secularized systems of education that are based on particular beliefs and values (e.g., transcendentalism or fascism).  So just having a vision of the good, and teaching young people to follow it, can't be what makes some types of education "classical."

 

Something that stands out to me is that the lines you've quoted -- the bolded, especially -- are almost identical to the words used by "progressive" Catholics in the first half of the 20th century.  And they used these arguments to justify getting rid of the centuries-old system of classical education, in favor of a more "social reconstructionist" type of curriculum (basically a Christianized version of what the secular progressives were doing).  In the new system, teachers of literature were expected to have an overriding concern for reinforcing morals and forming a Catholic vision of life.  To make room for this, they got rid of the traditional emphasis on mental discipline and teaching the arts of expression.  

 

So it seems to me that what Hicks is aiming for isn't particularly classical, in itself -- and, if taken to an extreme, could actually become incompatible with classical education as it's been understood through history.   I think it would be better described as "idealistic education."  

[Mrs. A]

 

So it seems to me that what Hicks is aiming for isn't particularly classical, in itself -- and, if taken to an extreme, could actually become incompatible with classical education as it's been understood through history.   I think it would be better described as "idealistic education."  

 

 

This an important observation. I think many times people get hung up on whether or not an author or speaker is accurately representing "classical" education as it has historically been understood. And it's fine to be concerned about accuracy, because an author who is writing about it ought to know what he's talking about.  But here we are seeing that Hicks, by offering a personal interpretation, may not end up being 100 percent "classical" in his ideas about application or purpose etc. 

 

For me personally, the label doesn't matter. I don't care whether you call it classical, idealistic our what have you. What I'm interested in is learning about the kind of education that forms and shapes souls. My goal in educating my children is not so that they can know what they do not know, but to behave as they do not behave. ( paraphrasing from the end of the book here. Sorry I can't give a page number - I had a library copy when I read it).  That's why I like this book - because Hicks is interested in "the cultivation of the human spirit" and so am I. 

[serendipitous journey]

Norms and ideals are supposed to be a part of all Christian education, and I think the same would apply to most other religious traditions.   If you take out some of the the parts about God, they're also a part of secularized systems of education that are based on particular beliefs and values (e.g., transcendentalism or fascism).  So just having a vision of the good, and teaching young people to follow it, can't be what makes some types of education "classical."

 

...

 

I think the classical element of Hicks' view of education will be seen largely in the means, which he doesn't really mention here.  It is true that the description quoted by LostCove above could apply to other educational systems.  But not as easily as it might seem.  For instance, the emphasis on teaching the child to "know what is good" and to "serve it above self" -- this is not identical to teaching her what is good and teaching her to behave properly.  The difference between the two is central to my understanding of classical education. 

 

This an important observation. I think many times people get hung up on whether or not an author or speaker is accurately representing "classical" education as it has historically been understood. And it's fine to be concerned about accuracy, because an author who is writing about it ought to know what he's talking about.  But here we are seeing that Hicks, by offering a personal interpretation, may not end up being 100 percent "classical" in his ideas about application or purpose etc. 

 

For me personally, the label doesn't matter. I don't care whether you call it classical, idealistic our what have you. What I'm interested in is learning about the kind of education that forms and shapes souls. My goal in educating my children is not so that they can know what they do not know, but to behave as they do not behave. ( paraphrasing from the end of the book here. Sorry I can't give a page number - I had a library copy when I read it).  That's why I like this book - because Hicks is interested in "the cultivation of the human spirit" and so am I. 

 

I agree with that last part!  And I keep finding myself returning to methods and materials at least somewhat "classical" in my efforts to cultivate the human spirit in my own home. 

 

Thinking about both this quote and what ElizaG said above: I am encouraged and inspired by the classical ideal of citizens -- of people actively engaged in the social and political world -- who nurtured an deep understanding of their world, themselves, each other, and the eternal.  I can work with these concepts because the ancients encouraged people to think for themselves, to work out their own paths honestly, and be willing to challenge tradition where they find it errs. 

 

ETA: "challenging tradition where it errs" is not quite what I meant. Rather, to stand with good; to stand against wrong; to do so no matter where they are found. 

[Coco_Clark]

Because I do not want this discussion to be allowed to languish on the third page I will say that I have been struck very recently by how difficult I find it to define "Classical education".  When I say that I homeschool classically, people's minds jump to "oh so you teach Latin?" or "oh so you believe in lots of rigorous book learning?".  Those things may or may not be true, whether true or not I do not believe either defines classical education.  But while I know it when I see it, I'm still at a loss of words in these situations to say what classical is.  

 

Circe defines it as "the cultivation of wisdom and virtue by nourishing the soul on truth, goodness, and beauty by means of the seven liberal arts and the four sciences."  This really hits true to me, but it seems a vague mouthful for small-talk. Perhaps I am just terrible at small talk.    

 

If we are allowed to begin discussing chapter 1, Hicks defines the classical model as being based around curiosity, hypothesis, and methodical testing.  I'm right in his boat as to curiosity but I have to admit I stepped back when he began to talk about the next two.  I think it is because I was myself educated in such a progressive way but the very words hypothesis, logic, and testing make me thing of cold scientific "facts".   Hicks states religious and emotional experience can confirm hypothesis, so he must see those words differently than I do.

 

Hicks contrasts the classical model with the scientific method thus, "In them, human experience tends to be dealt with narrowly and reductively, broken down into isolated, unconnected units; students ignorant of what questions to ask are presented with uninvited and consequently meaningless information; and there is no basis for making moral and aesthetic judgments or for attaching learning to behavior."

 

So from that I am getting that a classical education is a whole education.  It is an education that is based on curiosity, that promotes connections, that asks questions, that makes judgments, and that requires learned behaviors.  Still not quite what I need for small talk situations, but I feel that I'm getting somewhere in learning what kind of education I want to provide ;)

 

[Beth in Mint Hill]

I am going to get daring here and weigh in on what stood out to me from my readings of N&N over 10 years ago. My copy is filled with notes and highlights! But I have not reread it recently.

As I skim through and look at the sections, the message that keeps coming back to me--the overwhelming theme that stuck with me--is that classical education recognizes that the verbal arts (the trivium) take precedence over the naturalistic scientific studies; these "quantifiable arts" are very important and useful to our materialistic existence, but they need to be guided by minds that can understand and communicate about ideals. To put it more simply: The verbal/ literary is essential to education, because we deal with the eternal human concerns this way.
 
Literature, history and philosophy had been practically classified as frivolous courses when he was writing this. (Remember it was published in the early 80s)  So he goes to lengths to show why the literary is essential. He is echoing Richard Weaver, who said this in Ideas Have Consequences: "There is no difficulty in securing enough agreement for action on the point that education should serve the needs of the people. But all hinges on the interpretation of needs; if the primary need of man is to perfect his spiritual being and prepare for immortality, then education of the mind and the passions will take precedence over all else. The growth of materialism, however, has made this a consideration remote and even incomprehensible to the majority."

 

T. S. Eliot said:
"It is only within a particular social system that a system of education has any meaning. If education today seems to deteriorate, if it seems to become more and more chaotic and meaningless, it is primarily because we have no settled and satisfactory arrangement of society, and because we have both vague and diverse opinions about the kind of society we want. Education is a subject which cannot be discussed in a void: our questions raise other questions, social, economic, financial, political. And the bearings are on more ultimate problems even than these: to know what we want in education we must know what we want in general, we must derive our theory of education from our philosophy of life."~from the essay, "Modern Education and the Classics"
 
So I believe that Hicks is trying to articulate the attitudes and approaches that unify and direct a true Christian education. We need an education that understands the supreme importance of language. What other means do we have to connect and grow, and find community with other human souls?

[JaneEyre]

Is curiosity* really Classical? Does a goal of promoting it in our children serve the greater goal of a classical education; "the cultivation of wisdom and virtue by nourishing the soul on truth, goodness, and beauty by means of the seven liberal arts and the four sciences."?

 

For example, I'm re-reading St. Theophane the Recluse's Raising Them Right and was struck today by the following passages. "But in doing this it is impossible to avoid curiosity, which is an irresistible inclination to see and hear without purpose - what is being done where, and how things are." " That is, one must train the child to investigate what is considered to be essential for him, but to refrain from and avoid everything else." I do not suggest that St. Theophane is an expert on classical education however he articulates the Orthodox spiritual tradition and the Patristic tradition.

 

I'm also reminded of this quote from John Cardinal Newman "there are many, who certainly have a taste for reading, but in whom it is little more than the result of mental restlessness and curiosity. Such minds cannot fix their gaze on one object for two seconds together; the very impulse which leads them to read at all, leads them to read on, and never to stay or hang over any one idea." (On the Idea of a University)

 

*I think we would have to define "curiosity" to flesh this out more.

 

ETA to add that the people I've quoted were Christian. However, I think their concerns about "curiosity" apply to what "classical" is supposed to promote. Does promoting "curiosity" in our children help them to discern what is beautiful and good?

 

The thinking is, I believe,  that 'curiosity' can be bad, but that 'wonder' is always good...

 

Here are some quotes I found ( I haven't reads the article or the essay that these are from, so I have no idea if they are sound.  I just borrowed the quotes):

 

"For the Greeks, curiosity was not even a clearly articulated concept. To the extent that it was acknowledged at all, it stands in contrast to its mercurial sibling, wonder. Aristotle believed that all humans naturally desire knowledge, but he felt that curiosity (periergia) had little role to play in philosophy. It was a kind of aimless, witless tendency to pry into things that didn’t concern us. Wonder (thauma) was far more significant, the true root of enquiry: ‘It is owing to their wonder,’ he wrote, ‘that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize.’ … Until the seventeenth century, wonder was esteemed while curiosity was reviled"

http://www.brainpickings.org/index.php/2013/04/12/philip-ball-curiosity/

 

 

"In Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger writes that although the early Greeks had a sense of wonder that served as the foundation for their poetry, science, and philosophy, we are unable to have that feeling; in fact, we misconstrue the experience by thinking in terms of curiosity. As he states,

t has long been known that the Greeks recognized thaumazein as the "beginning" of philosophy. But it is just as certain that we have taken this thaumazein to be obvious and ordinary, something that can be accomplished without difficulty and can even be clarified without further reflection. For the most part, the usual presentations of the origin of philosophy out of thaumazein result in the opinion that philosophy arises from curiosity. This is a weak and pitiful determination of origin, possible only where there has never been any reflection on what is supposed to be determined here in its origin. Indeed, we consider ourselves relieved of such reflection, precisely because we think that the derivation of philosophy out of curiosity also determines its essence.(GA45 156 / 135-136) 3

Our problem is not just that we confuse the words "wonder" and "curiosity," but that we fail to see that they (the early Greeks) did not. The necessary attunement for philosophical thinking is no longer accessible to us. Therefore, as Heidegger tells us in the essay "Was heißt Denken?,"what is "[m]ost thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking—not even yet."

 

http://www.academia.edu/419999/Curiosity_As_the_Thief_of_Wonder_An_Essay_on_Heideggers_Critique_of_the_Ordinary_Conception_of_Time

[Coco_Clark]

I believe Hicks is speaking of what we might call wonder (thanks Jane Eyre), not idle curiosity; a desire to know and understand the world (and through that the God that made the world), not an "inclination to see and hear without purpose". The opposite of Hick's curiosity, in my mind, would be disinterest. I see a lot of disinterest around me in the world :/

[justamouse]

Because I do not want this discussion to be allowed to languish on the third page I will say that I have been struck very recently by how difficult I find it to define "Classical education".  

I am sorry, I hope you all can carry on the conversation without me at times, I am under a deadline for a play and I am helping with costumes. My kids have leads, we're three weeks form the play, and it's crunch time. :D I will be on, but spottily. 

 

Is curiosity* really Classical? Does a goal of promoting it in our children serve the greater goal of a classical education; "the cultivation of wisdom and virtue by nourishing the soul on truth, goodness, and beauty by means of the seven liberal arts and the four sciences."?

 

For example, I'm re-reading St. Theophane the Recluse's Raising Them Right and was struck today by the following passages. "But in doing this it is impossible to avoid curiosity, which is an irresistible inclination to see and hear without purpose - what is being done where, and how things are." " That is, one must train the child to investigate what is considered to be essential for him, but to refrain from and avoid everything else." I do not suggest that St. Theophane is an expert on classical education however he articulates the Orthodox spiritual tradition and the Patristic tradition.

 

I'm also reminded of this quote from John Cardinal Newman "there are many, who certainly have a taste for reading, but in whom it is little more than the result of mental restlessness and curiosity. Such minds cannot fix their gaze on one object for two seconds together; the very impulse which leads them to read at all, leads them to read on, and never to stay or hang over any one idea." (On the Idea of a University)

 

*I think we would have to define "curiosity" to flesh this out more.

 

ETA to add that the people I've quoted were Christian. However, I think their concerns about "curiosity" apply to what "classical" is supposed to promote. Does promoting "curiosity" in our children help them to discern what is beautiful and good?

Curiosity-Latin, Curiosus, Careful, diligent, 'to care'. It doesn't quite sound like a vice as that first quote makes it out to be. 

[LostintheCosmos]

The curiosity question brought to mind something I had read a while back about St. Thomas, so I looked it up in the Summa. Under the section on temperance, he discusses a virtue, studiositas, and its opposing vice, curiositas - a few things that jumped out at me as being particularly relevant to some of the concerns we've raised. First, St. Thomas argues that study resulting in pride is curiositas, the vicious desire for knowledge:

 

"...knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Corinthians 8:1, 'Knowledge puffeth up," or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin."

 

He goes on to quote a passage from St. Augustine that speaks directly to the concern at the heart of N&N: "Some there are, who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with a surpassing curiosity and keeness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." Boom.

 

It also counts as curiositas if one has an "inordinate" desire for knowledge. St. Thomas breaks this down into four parts - the first one seems to be related to what St. Theophane is getting at - "when a man is drawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him." Guilty!

 

The third type of "inordinate" desire of knowledge also seems to get at what we are talking about here, "when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God." And, again quoting Augustine, "in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things."

 

(As an aside, it's not exactly relevant to our immediate concerns, so I will refrain from typing it out and causing us to commit the sin of curiositas  :laugh:  but I thought the reply to objection 3 in article 2 of the section on studiositas was really interesting)

 

All that being said, Hicks' intention is clearly not to encourage a vicious curiosity, and I agree he has in mind something more akin to wonder. Intriguingly, St. Thomas doesn't really talk about disinterest, although, one would think that if studiositas is the virtuous mean in regards to desire for knowledge, and curiositas is the vicious excess, something like disinterest would be the vicious deficiency. In fact, St. Thomas takes for granted man's desire for knowledge - studiositas is a subcategory of temperance precisely because it involves the restraint of a natural inclination. I guess that just shows how deforming many people's educational experience is, that it manages to, not just divert but utterly eviscerate their natural sense of wonder.

[justamouse]

I looked up the history of curious. It's funny how the meaning of the word changed from a negative to a positive. 
 

I guess that just shows how deforming many people's educational experience is, that it manages to, not just divert but utterly eviscerate their natural sense of wonder.

 

I wonder, too, how much a modern education trains and promotes curiositias. Light reading, lack of depth, humans as units of production would feed it, it would seem. 

 

[ElizaG]

I think the fourth type of curiositas mentioned by St. Thomas is relevant here, too:

 

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Sirach 3:22): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Sirach 3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity."

 

From another part of the Summa:  "intelligence properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand."  So it's not just referring to a fixed capacity, but to something that can be developed through education, or "intellectual training" (to use one of Newman's favorite phrases).   

 

The Great Books model turns this on its head, by pretty much encouraging everyone to read and form opinions about complex subjects -- theology, history, aesthetics, ethics, political and economic theories, etc. -- without any prerequisites, either for the student or the teacher.   Hicks seems to get around this by having the discussions be carefully steered by the teacher, who, in turn, is guided by some sort of normative tradition or other outside authority (because let's face it, a lot of the issues that are touched on are likely to be above the teacher's capacity, too).   I don't think this is a bad thing in itself, but it makes me question how much of what people are calling "critical thinking" is really going on in this sort of environment.   

[serendipitous journey]

I'm dipping into this conversation after a bit away being distracted by children ... are we discussing curiosity in a particular chapter/section, or generally?  

 

It is easy to imagine that idle curiosity is a great waster of time and that indulging it may lead to intellectual puffery.  However, I find Thomas' constraints on the questioning mind, as listed above, to curtail wonder and investigation short of their ideal and classical use: this being to get to the heart of things, even things that may not seem important until they are well understood. 

 

This conversation is touching on an interesting and, I hope, germane theme that keeps coming to my mind as I read Hicks: it is the scientists I know that are most full of wonder and also most willing to enter into discussions of the normative.  In literary and philosophical and art-historical circles I know of, asking what ought to be done is rather quaint; in scientific circles, normative questions are more likely to be seriously engaged. 

 

Regarding the Great Books: I do not read Adler (for example) as suggesting that one simply pick up Homer, give him a good run-though, and then establish some Opinions in the capital-O sense about antiquity or literature or anything particular; the Great Books idea seems to more be that one is expanded by seriously engaging great books, that one can then enter into the "Great Conversation".  So one gives Homer a careful, layered and honest reading and then responds to Homer, reflects on the work.  Then one goes on: living, reading, broadened by Homer.   Certainly one is better able to talk about Homer than before. 

 

The idea behind the Great Books is not that any yahoo can give a difficult book the assessment it warrants, but that anyone who tackles great books honestly and humbly will find their spirit broadened and deepened by the experience; and that after one has read great books one is better prepared to engage the issues than before.  Because none of us living deeply can avoid engaging "theology, history, aesthetics, ethics, political and economic theories", working through the classic texts in these areas can serve us well. 

[serendipitous journey]

 

If we are allowed to begin discussing chapter 1, Hicks defines the classical model as being based around curiosity, hypothesis, and methodical testing.  I'm right in his boat as to curiosity but I have to admit I stepped back when he began to talk about the next two.  I think it is because I was myself educated in such a progressive way but the very words hypothesis, logic, and testing make me thing of cold scientific "facts".   Hicks states religious and emotional experience can confirm hypothesis, so he must see those words differently than I do.

 

Hicks contrasts the classical model with the scientific method thus, "In them, human experience tends to be dealt with narrowly and reductively, broken down into isolated, unconnected units; students ignorant of what questions to ask are presented with uninvited and consequently meaningless information; and there is no basis for making moral and aesthetic judgments or for attaching learning to behavior."

 

So from that I am getting that a classical education is a whole education.  It is an education that is based on curiosity, that promotes connections, that asks questions, that makes judgments, and that requires learned behaviors.  Still not quite what I need for small talk situations, but I feel that I'm getting somewhere in learning what kind of education I want to provide ;)

 

This section of N&N is heavily marked up by me!  I agree with so much of what Hicks says, but also find that he demonstrates a very poor understanding of how such things happen in science (well, in good science). 

 

To be precise, the bit about narrow and reductive experience is said about modern educators, not scientists.  Now I don't think this means much, but I think it means something, because I've tried to pin down where Hicks slanders (in my opinion) scientists and have found that in nearly all cases he is really taking on the modern educational system which (in my opinion) warrants the slander.  Certainly any sensible educational theorist or researcher I've read thinks the current system is riddled with stupidity. 

 

At any rate, only truly terrible science would result from the description given.  DH, a neuroscientist who runs a lab researching how learning is related to behavior (I kid you not!) considers that helping his students learn to ask good questions is one of his chief teaching responsibilities; and moral -- not to mention aesthetic -- judgments run though the work, such as making the software they write free and open-source (since the funding is via the government, and so the public should own the results).  That is to say: Hicks' characterization, and the general understanding, of science and of the empirical method is very far removed from the reality.

 

And is it not odd that Hicks stresses the value of Aristotle's theoretic life as "the true end of education and the source of happiness," saying that "the theoretic life is the life of virtue," whilst quoting that "What Aristotle calls theoria is emphatically an activity ... In the first place, scientific research is theoria, and no doubt Aristotle was thinking chiefly of that"?  I think that empirical reasoning plays a much stronger role in Aristotle's thinking than Hicks would like. 

[Beth in Mint Hill]

...

To be precise, the bit about narrow and reductive experience is said about modern educators, not scientists.  Now I don't think this means much, but I think it means something, because I've tried to pin down where Hicks slanders (in my opinion) scientists and have found that in nearly all cases he is really taking on the modern educational system which (in my opinion) warrants the slander. ...

 

Yes!

 

 

 

... DH, a neuroscientist who runs a lab researching how learning is related to behavior (I kid you not!) considers that helping his students learn to ask good questions is one of his chief teaching responsibilities; 

 

To actually inspire students to read, think, investigate, and take time to do it, is such a tall order in our culture. (sigh) When I teach groups of 14 and 15yos, I am just amazed that they feel entitled to an opinion about Homer or Dante, having glanced over a couple of pages--or perhaps, just having the book sit on their desk for a few days! Parents often complain that there is not enough "discussion" yet they spend very little effort ensuring that their child has time to read the book.

 

I finally began to develop short 'reading quizzes' designed to just ascertain whether the students read the literature, if they passed then they could take part in the discussion. These quizzes would ask about details that would easily stand out to one who had actually spent time reading the passage, but were not important enough issues to be found in "Cliff notes."

[justamouse]

I think the fourth type of curiositas mentioned by St. Thomas is relevant here, too:

 

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Sirach 3:22): "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious," and further on (Sirach 3:26), "For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity."

 

From another part of the Summa:  "intelligence properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand."  So it's not just referring to a fixed capacity, but to something that can be developed through education, or "intellectual training" (to use one of Newman's favorite phrases).   

 

The Great Books model turns this on its head, by pretty much encouraging everyone to read and form opinions about complex subjects -- theology, history, aesthetics, ethics, political and economic theories, etc. -- without any prerequisites, either for the student or the teacher.   Hicks seems to get around this by having the discussions be carefully steered by the teacher, who, in turn, is guided by some sort of normative tradition or other outside authority (because let's face it, a lot of the issues that are touched on are likely to be above the teacher's capacity, too).   I don't think this is a bad thing in itself, but it makes me question how much of what people are calling "critical thinking" is really going on in this sort of environment.   

 

I think the context of this needs to be explained a little, because to a person reading this without the understanding of the Sacred Tradition that St Thomas follows, it sounds as if he's trying to keep the working man down by telling him he's not smart enough to read the Great Books. 

 

 

[LostintheCosmos]

I think the context of this needs to be explained a little, because to a person reading this without the understanding of the Sacred Tradition that St Thomas follows, it sounds as if he's trying to keep the working man down by telling him he's not smart enough to read the Great Books. 

 

 

 

Well, this is a bit off-topic, but I would hate to have anyone think of St. Thomas as some kind of narrow-minded chauvinist because of sections of the Summa that I pulled out of context.  :sad: St. Thomas was precisely the opposite - he was intellectually fearless! Truly one of the most remarkable voices in the "great conversation," at a time when many were nervous about the rediscovery of Aristotelian texts, St. Thomas not only embraced the study of Aristotle but made his entire project the reconciliation of theology and philosophy in a way that lessened neither! In fact, I would recommend St. Thomas particularly to those in this conversation who are dissatisfied with Hicks' treatment of science. And, of course, he was a Dominican, one of the new, radical, and somewhat suspect mendicant orders. Just one brief quote from the Angelic Doctor that I hope conveys some of what he was up to:

 

"They hold a plainly false opinion who say that in regard to the truth of religion it does not matter what a man thinks about the Creation so long as he has the correct opinion concerning God. An error concerning the Creation ends as false thinking about God."

 

 

Regarding the Great Books: I do not read Adler (for example) as suggesting that one simply pick up Homer, give him a good run-though, and then establish some Opinions in the capital-O sense about antiquity or literature or anything particular; the Great Books idea seems to more be that one is expanded by seriously engaging great books, that one can then enter into the "Great Conversation".  So one gives Homer a careful, layered and honest reading and then responds to Homer, reflects on the work.  Then one goes on: living, reading, broadened by Homer.   Certainly one is better able to talk about Homer than before. 

 

The idea behind the Great Books is not that any yahoo can give a difficult book the assessment it warrants, but that anyone who tackles great books honestly and humbly will find their spirit broadened and deepened by the experience; and that after one has read great books one is better prepared to engage the issues than before.  Because none of us living deeply can avoid engaging "theology, history, aesthetics, ethics, political and economic theories", working through the classic texts in these areas can serve us well. 

 

On the whole, this describes my experience of the study of great books in the classroom. My favorite professors absolutely modeled this kind of humble, leisurely engagement, returning with students to texts they had surely read dozens upon dozens of times already, but never seeming finished, never rushing us through to get the point of Hamlet or the Phaedrus or Paradise Lost or whatever - often, we did not actually make it through the book by the end of the term. The focus was precisely not on forming an opinion on the text or on the subject of the text, but simply on the text itself and giving it a true and honest hearing, observing what it is. The only prerequisite was being able to back up your interpretive claims with textual evidence. 

 

However I have heard that in some places, the great books are studied primarily through the framework of passing judgement on whether they fit in with the "worldview" of the readers. That sort of jump to judgment and reading of books merely to either give or withhold a stamp of approval seems obviously wrong, whatever the right approach might be. I would also say my experience was almost entirely at the undergraduate level, whereas the "worldview" approach I have heard about was with younger students. 

 

Something I am thinking about as I keep reading (I'm just getting into chapter four now): what difference does it make that I am a home educator, not a teacher or school leader? How and in what ways does Hicks' argument take the school setting for granted? How does that affect any applications in the home setting? How does our task differ from his? Again, I'm still in the early stages of the book, but the absence of much discussion of the affections is one thing that has jumped out at me. 

[KellieK]

I think we should move on to discuss chapter 2. I am having a hard time wrapping my mind what Hicks is saying, maybe I am just not understanding this part. The Mythos is the imaginative and spiritual way man explains the world, and the logos is the rational way to explain it? This just seems to me like what is explained by mythos has just not been "proven" by reason or are they explaining two different parts. The mythos attempting to make sense of ideas and logos of physical realities.

 

I have been sitting here for 20 minutes trying to type something that makes sense, but it is obvious that I do not get this. Please someone explain this to me again. I have read this chapter twice.

[serendipitous journey]

I think we should move on to discuss chapter 2. I am having a hard time wrapping my mind what Hicks is saying, maybe I am just not understanding this part. The Mythos is the imaginative and spiritual way man explains the world, and the logos is the rational way to explain it? This just seems to me like what is explained by mythos has just not been "proven" by reason or are they explaining two different parts. The mythos attempting to make sense of ideas and logos of physical realities.

 

I have been sitting here for 20 minutes trying to type something that makes sense, but it is obvious that I do not get this. Please someone explain this to me again. I have read this chapter twice.

 

I'm working on this.  :)  been a crazier-than-usual evening though so it's super slow going

 

[KellieK]

I'm working on this. :) been a crazier-than-usual evening though so it's super slow going

Thanks, I look forward to hearing what you have to say. I have been mulling this over all day and I am starting to wrap my brain around it.

[serendipitous journey]

I think we should move on to discuss chapter 2. I am having a hard time wrapping my mind what Hicks is saying, maybe I am just not understanding this part. The Mythos is the imaginative and spiritual way man explains the world, and the logos is the rational way to explain it? This just seems to me like what is explained by mythos has just not been "proven" by reason or are they explaining two different parts. The mythos attempting to make sense of ideas and logos of physical realities.

 

I have been sitting here for 20 minutes trying to type something that makes sense, but it is obvious that I do not get this. Please someone explain this to me again. I have read this chapter twice.

 

Okay, this is what I have so far.  I am sure it is inadequate but hope it provides grist for the mill. 

 

Chapter 2 is titled "The Word is Truth" and deals with concepts of logos, mythos, and the inadequacy of science with regard to either logos or mythos.  It lies between chapter 1, "Virtue is the Fruit of Learning" in which Hicks outlines his ideas about the goals of learning, and chapter 3, "Teaching the Father of Man" which seems to be a description of Hicks' ideas regarding ideal teachers (schoolmasters).  So as I see it, Hicks is moving from describing the general goals of classical education on to describing the ideal mode of teaching (logos/mythos properly used) and will then give a description of the qualities a schoolmaster had/must have in order to address classical goals via the classical mode of using logos & mythos. 

 

Hicks begins:

"While establishing his dialectical credentials, Socrates shocked his contemporaries by arguing that virtue and vice are not the inherent properties of objects; they result instead from the rational or irrational use of objects.  More incredibly, he taught that it is worse to wrong another than to wrong oneself.  Such unorthodox notions seemed to contradict the evidence of human experience, especially as recorded in the myths.  The sudden rational articulation of these two propositions concerning the nature of virtue forecast a violent collision between Socrates' dialectical logos and the dogmatic mythos.  To the affects of this collision on education, we now must turn our attention.

 

Originally, the Greek logos meant simply "word," or "the word by which the inward thought is expressed."  Perhaps the mythos shaped the logos in primeval times, molding the first words to the contours of its compelling narrative; but after awhile, as old words appeared in new contexts and took on reicher shades of meaning, the logos began asserting itself, bringing to each new myth the values and colors of old former myths.  The discovery of reason attended this phenomenon.  However nonrational myths were, they betrayed man's urge to explain what he found in himself and in the world, as well as his belief that explanation was somehow possible.  Regardless of how firmly they avowed the inscrutability of Divine Reason, the early cosmological myths belied a confidence that reason existed and left the way open for man to decipher what reason he could from the puzzling pattern of the gods' behavior.  This pattern reflected the myth-maker's insight into the internal end external realities and aided man in developing rules for ordering his thought and behavior in accordance with the immanent reasonableness of these realities." 

 

Let me say that it isn't at all clear to me that this paragraph is an accurate description of Socrates' reception by his ancient audience.  And I believe the logos thing is contested.  I wish Hicks would cite generously and substantiate his claims. 

 

However. 

 

Hicks introduces the concepts of mythos (roughly, stories with powerful and true meanings) and logos (rather messily).  He says that when Socrates pointed out that physical things are not inherently either good or evil, but are simply tools to be put to good or evil purposes, Socrates forced people to rethink their reliance on myths, on stories that were obviously (at one level) not true in the sense of being in the observable universe, but were obviously (at a different) level true in their revelation of important realities.  So that thinking Greeks didn't really believe that there was a mountain somewhere with Zeus ensconced at its peak, reveling with his god-relatives &c.  But they did find that the myths about the gods expressed very powerfully truths about the way the universe seemed to run, and the probability that there was some designing figure behind everything, and the necessary hope that what people do matters. 

 

Hicks suggests that this understanding of mythos is related to the imbuing of physical objects with ethical, or perhaps mystical, properties.  So that when Socrates says that objects have no inherent moral weight, this is a challenge to fundamental beliefs.  Socrates, in this view, was breaking the symbolic and mythological value people put on the physical world.  He was pointing out that this value was a story-value, not an observable-value. 

 

Now when Hicks says people were startled to think that it is worse to harm someone else than oneself, I am not sure this is correct.  In a culture so given to stories of heroic self-sacrifice as the Greeks it had surely occurred to many people (though perhaps not most). Perhaps Hicks is trying to say that the ancient myths were so full of self-serving heroes and figures that the idea that harming others is worse than harming oneself seems a violation of mythology?  except that is is clear that many Greek myths had examples of poor behavior, they were hardly held up as universal models of how one ought to be. 

 

At any rate. 

 

In the second paragraph, Hicks conceives of myths as being invented at a particular instant or time.  This first myths used language, which was simple and had "first words" with simple and direct meanings, to tell stories of how things had come to be and what they meant: creation stories, pourquoi tales, &c.  Then as language gathered more complex and nuanced meanings, and there came to be more and more myths which related to each other, the words used in the myths acquired layered meanings -- the red blood of one myth brought to mind the red clay of other stories, for example.  Hicks says that the "discovery of reason" attended this phenomenon, I don't see how that follows at all.  But he means that these layered meanings were used to give a rational understanding of the world -- to assign meaning to the meaningless of nature and fate. 

 

Hicks goes on to say that the use of symbolic meaning, or myth, along with rational meaning, or logos, is a feature of the modern as well as the ancient mind. 

 

Then there is a really specious critique of "scientific rationalism and its methods of analysis" which "demand a language of pure denotation to explain programs, techniques, and mechanisms."  He concludes that "the analytical method itself calls into question the utility and reality of such concepts as valor, while affirming that of the distributor cap." 

 

The history of science does include experiments with pure language, devoid of the tangles that real language has -- it soon became clear that such a language is impossible.  It is a straw-man position, not a real one to be attacked: Hicks criticism is similar to a complaint that classical philosophy is hopeless decadent and corrupt because of the follies of Epicureanism. 

 

Regarding valor, analysis of valor has yielded some important insights about heroism and its limits.  Analysis is one way to approach the concept of valor; intuitive reading is another; scientists adapt the method to their means in their understanding and use of valor.  Recall Marie and Irene Curie, putting x-ray equipment to surgical use in World War 1, outfitting ambulances with x-rays to diagnose wounds and locate schrapnel for removal; training others in the techniques; trudging through the front lines in their work.  In reading Hicks, it is important to remember that such are members of the scientific community. 

 

okay, must care for children and home!  but it's a start.

 

ETA:  RE Plato further in the chapter: Hicks says, I think, that Plato tried to restore essential reality to myths ("saving the appearance") by conceiving of logos as being not just a rational/formal way of thinking, and thus in opposition to mythical thinking, but as being a True Word that preceded and inspired the mythos.  Essentially, logos as the Platonic ideal -- the true, underlying reality -- of which the myths were a reflection/expression.  The bit about Plato's failure is weird, I find.  I suppose Hicks means that Platonic ideals didn't really catch on. 

[ElizaG]

Regarding valor, analysis of valor has yielded some important insights about heroism and its limits.  Analysis is one way to approach the concept of valor; intuitive reading is another; scientists adapt the method to their means in their understanding and use of valor.  Recall Marie and Irene Curie, putting x-ray equipment to surgical use in World War 1, outfitting ambulances with x-rays to diagnose wounds and locate schrapnel for removal; training others in the techniques; trudging through the front lines in their work.  In reading Hicks, it is important to remember that such are members of the scientific community. 

 

If the question is "can scientists understand valor," then obviously they can.  And this can inspire them to use their discoveries in the service of others.  But are they getting that understanding from analytical methods, or from some other aspect of their formation?   After all, they do have other influences, in their education, family, and social life.  It's not as if the "scientific community" has been sealed off from birth.  ;)

 

To take Marie Curie as an example:  she came from a family that was highly educated in both literature and science; was raised with a strong sense of Polish nationalism; was taught the rudiments of the Catholic faith; and went to a girls' gymnasium.  And this is all before age 16, several years before she started her intensive scientific studies.  

 

I think it might be interesting to look at the types of secondary education that were followed by well-known scientists, and see if there's any correlation to the way they've dealt with questions of values in their careers. (And now I'm remembering that you and I touched on this topic somewhat in an old thread. :001_smile: )

[serendipitous journey]

no, the question isn't if scientists can understand valor, which of course they can: you are right, it would be a stupid question.  

 

The question is, what is Hicks saying?  and then I included a bit of my opinion on his reasonableness (or lack of ...) in this case.   He seems to argue that analytical thinking precludes imaginative thinking. 

 

ETA  -- I think I'll have to step away from this discussion for a bit -- there is too much going on here at home, which I've been neglecting and oughtn't.  That's normative, at least!  :)  Heaven willing & the creek don't rise, will check back in this weekend. 

 

 

 

 

 

[serendipitous journey]

okay, okay, I am unable to tear myself away.  :blushing:

 

but RE chapter 2: has anyone else noticed that Hicks uses erotic poetry to define our "finest feelings"?  (I know, I know: Song of Songs is Spiritual.  but that is clearly why it is in the canon, not why it was written -- on this scholars are largely in agreement)

 

or that the only description of ideal femaleness, as I can find in his whole book, is that she be gorgeous and ready for plucking as a ripe pomegranate?  Really.  At least the Ideal Type for men has some character requirements attached. 

 

and no, I do not buy that the "Ideal Type" elsewhere described is intended by Hicks to be female-inclusive.  I don't think female-inclusive is on Hicks' radar. 

 

okay, off the soapbox.

[serendipitous journey]

... anyone still working on this?  :)  Shall we let it rest? 

[The Governess]

I finally got around to reading it last week! I'm up for discussing. :D

[ElizaG]

I never did find mine, but have recently managed to get hold of another copy.   :001_smile:  So I'm also up for continuing the discussion.  

[KellieK]

I have been reading and am dying to discuss it! I was planning to post something this afternoon when I got everyone settled here.

[Kfamily]

I have mine again (lost in storage for awhile) and I'm on chapter 5. Could I start with you when you're on this chapter?

[justamouse]

Well, by all means, let's discuss! 

Y'all start, I'll catch up. I'll pull it out to read after CCD tonight and read chat 4/5.

[serendipitous journey]

Are we done with chapter 2, then? because I was unconvinced.  I mean, I came away with this feeling that there is no there there ... Hicks' writing seems essentially a personal reaction; his understanding of modern empiricism/science is stunted, so his critiques are aimed at straw men; and his interpretation of much of the ancients seems idiosyncratic at the best. 

[The Governess]

Are we done with chapter 2, then? because I was unconvinced. I mean, I came away with this feeling that there is no there there ... Hicks' writing seems essentially a personal reaction; his understanding of modern empiricism/science is stunted, so his critiques are aimed at straw men; and his interpretation of much of the ancients seems idiosyncratic at the best.

I really liked this quote: "A good myth, like a good map, enables the wanderer to survive, perhaps even flourish, in the wilderness."

 

I think I have experienced what he is getting at in my own learning and in teaching my girls. The myths provide a poetic introduction. They speak to us in a way that is "below" rational thought, that is closer to our heart or emotional core. It's the stories of heroes, inspiring or tragic, that cause us to care. I see this all the time as I teach my girls. The myths draw them in like magic, and then history becomes something more than just "stuff that happened."

 

I don't know much about ancient philosophy, but I felt that this was the spirit of what he was getting at in this chapter. Or maybe it's just my personal interpretation. :D

[Tress]

I'm really behind. I was reading the prologue, then I had several bad migraines in a row, just when this discussion thread started. Then I came back and you were all discussing so many things, so I went :leaving: .

 

I'm going to try again, starting with chapter 1 and trying to catch up to you all.

[justamouse]

Are we done with chapter 2, then? because I was unconvinced.  I mean, I came away with this feeling that there is no there there ... Hicks' writing seems essentially a personal reaction; his understanding of modern empiricism/science is stunted, so his critiques are aimed at straw men; and his interpretation of much of the ancients seems idiosyncratic at the best. 

Apparently you don't like it. That's ok. And it sounds like you don't want to be convinced or have a conversation about the merits of the book. 

 

I think this sometimes goes better if you've heard the whole argument (read the whole book) and then come back to chapter by chapter. 

 

Because this can certainly be a discussion killer. 

[KellieK]

I think this sometimes goes better if you've heard the whole argument (read the whole book) and then come back to chapter by chapter. 

 

Because this can certainly be a discussion killer. 

 

I agree with this. The more I read of the book the more I understand the whole. I plan to finish the book and then start over. I am really wanting to discuss this book. Yesterday did not work out as I had four extra children show up in the afternoon. Hopefully today. I looked over my notes for chapter 4 already and am forming my thoughts as I type.